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On (not) assembling a market for sustainable energy: heat
network infrastructure and British cities
Janette Webb and David Hawkey
School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
ABSTRACT
Energy policies increasingly rely on market instruments to meet societal
objectives for climate change mitigation. We explore the application of
such instruments in low carbon heat markets. Using a conceptual
framework derived from actor network theory and economic sociology,
we examine the role of technical-economic models as market devices in
two heat network proposals in British cities. Government intermediaries
relied on the models to enact the mutual financial and carbon benefits
of an area-wide heat market, and to enrol multiple public sector
organisations in innovation. In practice, the models produced the
opposite response: parties synthesised the modelled cost–benefit
calculations into the existing public services market agencement and
translated the model numbers ino opportunities to secure competitive
advantage for their own organisation. These activities undermined the
projected cost and carbon saving logic of the collective actor solution.
The findings demonstrate the potent economic agency of market-
emulating public finance and competitive procurement instruments in
governing such organisational decisions, and indicate the limited
traction of a low carbon calculus, which lacked significant political or
senior management sponsorship. Questions are posed about the
formatting of economic agency suited to securing the common goods
of a sustainable society.
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Rather than pick a winning technology, the Government will create markets that enable competing low carbon
technologies to win the largest market share as the pace of change accelerates in the 2020s UK Carbon Plan,
2011, p12.
Advanced capitalist societies depend fundamentally on coal, oil and gas, but this dependence is pro-
ducing increasingly severe societal risks from climate change. Although government policies encode
commitments to new sustainable energy, implementing such radical change is without precedent,
and means of governance are uncertain. The UK Carbon Plan 2011 positions markets as key instru-
ments of cost effective innovation. Markets have well-established advantages in economic coordi-
nation, and creative responses to new information, but there are signiﬁcant questions about their
adaptability as policy instruments to mitigate climate change. Most famously, Stern’s (2007) report
to the UK government concluded that climate change represents the most signiﬁcant market failure
in history, reiterating a basic tenet of economics that markets are particularly unsuited to production
of public goods. Political commitment, grounded in normative economic theory of efﬁcient markets,
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has nevertheless focused on their expected advantages for low carbon innovation. Normative theory
asserts that the utility-maximising self-interest of those ‘with the resources to act as market agents’
(Mitchell 2011, p. 196) motivates discovery of the least cost means to a clean energy system. Govern-
ment’s role becomes that of ‘supporting the market to discover solutions’, including shaping the mar-
ket ‘where necessary to overcome barriers’ (UK Government DECC 2013, p. 7), and keeping options
open by providing ‘information for market players … to enable effective decision-making’ (p. 79)
about cost-optimal solutions.
Our paper examines the application of this policy model to the attempted creation of markets for
low carbon heat networks, which use underground hot water pipes to supply heating, and hot water,
to clusters of buildings. Our conceptual framework is derived from a material sociology of markets,
where materiality comprises the physical artefacts of energy technology, the technicalities of econ-
omic, contractual and regulatory instruments, and the affective, cognitive and social qualities of
human beings (MacKenzie 2009). The framework seeks to avoid a normative stance on markets,
focusing instead on empirical analysis of their heterogeneous socio-technical constituents and pro-
cesses of qualification, production and circulation of goods (Caliskan & Callon 2009, 2010). The con-
ceptual framework opens up questions about the scope for reflexivity in designing markets for
different purposes, including public goods such as a stable climate. We used this approach to
study two experiments in assembling a heat market, focusing on the interaction of public sector
organisations, envisaged in policy as ‘market players’, with technical-economic models intended
by government intermediaries to work as devices to establish new facts about the energy, cost and
carbon efficiencies of collaboration in a heat network infrastructure.
In current UK climate change policy, a number of heat technologies are considered likely to con-
tribute to 2050 zero emissions targets for buildings,1 including electric heat pumps, combined heat
and power (CHP) generators, thermal treatment of waste and biomass or biogas boilers. Heat net-
works can use these and other technologies to share available heat sources, especially those more
feasible at larger scale and usually wasted, among clusters of buildings, and are intended to enable
more efficient overall use of resources (Lund et al. 2014). The economies of scale associated with lar-
ger networks have cost, carbon saving and welfare benefits, because they combine higher density and
diversity of heat demand. This decreases average cost per user and allows higher value to be extracted
from heat sources and infrastructure. Organisations such as hospitals, with high and stable patterns
of heat use, are hence critical components of an actor network capable of ‘anchoring’ system econ-
omics (King & Shaw 2010). UK policy models use technical-economic data-sets, similar to those
replicated at locality scale in our case studies, to construct scenarios for future ‘cost-optimal’ supply
of low carbon heat. This modelling is used in policy statements to suggest that heat networks could
supply somewhere between 20% and 43% of heat from 2030 out to 2050 (UK Government DECC
2013, p. 45).
As in other network infrastructures, developing a heat network is a collective actor problem.
Collaboration and long-term interdependence between heat suppliers, distributors, retailers and
users are necessary to securing the envisaged benefits from carbon, energy and cost saving.
These benefits are not however restricted to direct participants in development, and each direct
participant may calculate the costs to them as outweighing their share of expected benefits. The
selfish rational actor solution is to free ride on the willingness of other parties to take responsi-
bility. If all parties adopt the rationally self-interested position, however, the common benefits are
lost to all. Historically, the collective actor problem in network infrastructure has been resolved
through combinations of public planning, regulation and ownership. The British fossil fuel gas
grid, for example, was built under public ownership as part of macro-economic policy. The
gas and electricity grids were privatised in the 1990s, and energy policy in the UK now relies
on configuring markets attractive to commercial investment. Unlike the gas grid, however,
new heat infrastructure lacks regulated guarantees on investment and is hence positioned as
economically marginal in current markets. The challenge for demonstration projects is to assem-
ble a district heating business to meet a ‘commercially viable threshold’ (UK DECC 2013, p. 58)
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outside this regulated sector, in turn contributing to discovery of ‘the economically optimal extent
of heat networks’ (UK Government DECC Official). Solving the collective actor problem for heat
networks is hence largely reliant on market experiments (Callon 2009) to qualify the infrastruc-
ture as economically competitive.
Using a material sociology of markets to analyse low carbon heat proposals
The contemporary materialist analysis of markets has developed mainly from European sociology
and anthropology of economics (see e.g. Callon 1998), actor network theory (Callon & Latour
1981) and sociology of scientific knowledge (MacKenzie 2009). It is distinct from other economic
sociology traditions in at least two respects. First, rather than treating sociological theory as an
alternative explanatory model to economics, it examines the mutually constitutive relationships
between economic sciences, markets and processes of economisation in modern societies. In
other words, a market is analysed as ‘an achievement rather than … a pre-existing reality that
can simply be revealed and acted upon’ (Caliskan & Callon 2009, p. 370). This perspective asserts
that economic theories may have ‘performative’ effects through instruments which create the con-
ditions for a theoretical proposition to become true. In other words, economics may equip humans
and their organisations with means to conform more closely to the imagined homo economicus of
normative theory. Second, and relatedly, its model of economic agency is conceived not as residing
solely with human actors, but as distributed across heterogeneous socio-technical actor networks,
or agencements, of human and non-human constituents, including economic instruments, regulat-
ory institutions and physical infrastructures which mould calculative capacities, and configure
agents capable of qualifying goods and assessing their value (Caliskan & Callon 2010). This avoids
the foundational assumption of an economic agent with a fixed ontology or properties: capacities
and characteristics are defined by the components of particular agencements (Hardie & MacKenzie
2007).
By focusing on the specificity and particularities of market relations the material sociology per-
spective aims to go further than a social constructivist analysis; hence it investigates the constitutive
role of economics in creating knowledge about, and designing, markets. It also introduces questions
about the workings of ‘economics at large’ (Callon 2007), including finance, accounting and market-
ing disciplines, in prioritising and diffusing concepts of market efficiencies, calculability and com-
parative profitability of investments, and in extending the metrics and techniques available for
their appraisal. The making of a market resource and facts about its value are therefore objects of
enquiry, rather than being treated as abstractions or as pre-given entities (Caliskan & Callon
2009). This does not mean ignoring human sociality, cognition and affect, which are the embodied
components of a hybrid actor network, and which interact with the technical instruments of markets
in shaping dynamics of trust and distrust, cultural scripts and decision-making processes (Beckert
2011; Fligstein & Dauter 2007). The performativity of option pricing theory in financial markets
was for example demonstrated by MacKenzie and Millo (2003), but this was not an a-social impact
of a technical pricing formula on a fluid actor network. Instead the performativity of the theory was a
historically contingent and contested outcome, dependent on promotion through elites, as well as
embedding in the moral communities of the markets, based on social evaluations of reputation,
trustworthiness and respect.
The material sociology perspective is used here to contribute to ethnographic studies of market
experiments, where markets are instruments of low carbon energy policy. Such ethnography is cen-
tral to a research programme for empirical analysis of economisation processes in capitalist societies
(Caliskan & Callon 2010). It directs attention to shifting formations of economic agents, struggles
over valuations of goods, and the innovation potentials of markets in solving collective actor pro-
blems. Market experiments, shaped by ‘economics at large’, Callon (2008, 2009) suggests, are becom-
ing more common, drawing in wider circles of technical and legal experts, businesses, civil society
groups, scientists and governments. Such experimentation not only aims to open up new forms
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of market organisation, but also incorporates more explicitly the political dimensions of economisa-
tion. This seems especially evident in relation to climate change, where markets have been instru-
mental in creating the problems which market experiments are now expected to solve. In theory,
however such controversies
no longer appear as an obstacle to the functioning of markets, nor as a sign of the untruthfulness of calculations,
but as crucial moments in building the collective involved in market innovation and in generating knowledge
on the qualities of clean technologies. (Doganova & Karnoe 2015, pp. 29–30)
Framing, drawing boundaries around, and stabilising the value of, relevant qualities of a low car-
bon technology are fundamental to making market experiments work. But such qualities and
their valuations are contested, as parties challenge their deﬁnition and bring excluded qualities
back into the frame (Callon 1998). Market devices, deﬁned as the ‘material and discursive assem-
blages that intervene in the construction of markets’ (Muniesa et al. 2007, p. 2), are usually criti-
cal to the dialectics of such framing and overﬂowing. They construct facts about the qualities of
proposed products, and their exchange value, seeking to make such qualities visible, stable and
tradable (Doganova & Eyquem-Renault 2009), as a means to enrolling parties in market
innovations.
In our cases, we focus on the particular market device of the consulting engineers’ report, which is
advanced by government intermediaries and circulates among the prospective parties. The report
constitutes a technical-economic business model for an envisaged heat market experiment. It con-
sists of strategic selection and construction of data from complex and uncertain fields of possibility;
it simplifies and distills projected facts about value creation, translating these into a plausible, and
consistent, narrative (Doganova & Eyquem-Renault 2009; Garud et al. 2014). In technology entre-
preneurship, Doganova and Eyquem-Renault (2009) conclude that business models are not ‘disco-
vering’ pre-existing opportunities, but constituting something as a comprehensible, credible market
opportunity through recursive interactions with potential parties. The model aims to shape calcu-
lations of value, adapting to different responses, drawing in and building the actor network of a pro-
spective venture. In our cases, the technical-economic models condense the interdependencies and
complexities of energy market futures into a simplified narrative and data-set designed to qualify the
physical infrastructure of heat networks as cost and carbon competitive against a gas heating com-
parator. We explore the encounters between the model and the prospective ‘market players’ and ask
why assembly of heat market agencements proved precarious. In conclusion, we reflect briefly on the
significance of the findings for use of markets as instruments to solve collective actor problems of
energy and climate change.
Assembling a market for low carbon heat
Our case studies concern attempted assembly of a market for buying and selling heat (rather than gas
from the established grid); this required investment in a new underground pipe network carrying
heating and hot water from gas-fired CHP engines2 to clusters of large public sector organisations.
Since these are contemporary cases and their trajectory remains uncertain, the localities are ident-
ified only as East and West cities. Two different government agencies, each with responsibilities
for low carbon business innovation, brokered interactions between hospital, university and city
council officials, consulting engineers, lawyers and finance experts. Research access was negotiated
with each party. Fieldwork entailed multiple methods: first, review of local authority and government
energy strategies, district heating proposals, heat maps and technical-economic models; second,
observation of project meetings and participation in cross-sector knowledge exchange workshops3;
third, we conducted semi-structured interviews, combining a biographical and problem-oriented
format, and lasting from one to two hours. In the paper, we rely particularly on 18 interviews
with a total of 20 contributors; the larger project data-set of 114 interviews with 159 government,
business and civil society contributors informs our understanding of policy, technical-economic
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models, contractual and regulatory structures and environmental finance. The key interviews used in
the paper were audio-recorded, transcribed and analysed thematically.
Using markets to solve problems of innovation in low carbon heat: East andWest City heat
network proposals
In line with energy market policy, the proposals for heat networks sought to assemble financial value
from anticipated public goods of clean energy. Building the physical infrastructure of the network
however presented a collective actor problem of consent to long-term social, economic and technical
interdependencies in exchange for public goods of clean energy. The resulting enterprise would be
greater than the sum of its parts by sharing costs and benefits to secure the projected long-term sus-
tainability value of heat networks.
In East City, officials from government agencies, university, health service and city council met
in May 2013 to consider ‘if there is a willingness amongst stakeholders to consider the feasibility of
a project to develop a heat network’ (Briefing Note) at a significant green field site. The site was
defined as having ‘strategic economic importance’ for ‘green growth’ in the context of a city
plan ‘reliant upon the competitiveness and the attractiveness of East City as an investable place’
(Chris, East City economic development officer). Site development had commenced a decade
earlier with construction of a major teaching hospital and university research facilities. Their co-
location, and commissioning of a further hospital, were integral to plans for mobilising private
investment:
We have an American partner who creates life science parks throughout the world, or did until the market
downturn. (Jake, enterprise officer)
Development of the green ﬁeld site was contentious, and strict planning conditions set a CO2 emis-
sions’ reduction target 50% more ambitious than baseline standards. This was expected to be more
attainable than in city centre retroﬁt. The key market device relied on by government intermediaries
as an instrument of innovation was a technical-economic business model projecting mutual long-
term energy, cost and carbon savings from an area-wide heat network.
A year earlier in West City, officials from the Carbon Trust,4 two universities, the health service, a
further education college, the city council and government met to discuss a similar technical-econ-
omic model, but this time for heat network retrofit for an existing West City Centre Cluster of build-
ings. The proposals stemmed from a West City Future initiative, led by the city council and one
university, which again relied on mobilising private finance through a ‘green growth’ narrative.
The initiative cited commercial partners including two major energy companies and a New York
investment bank, and positioned heat network infrastructure as the technically and financially inte-
grated backbone of sustainable urban regeneration.
In both cities, all public sector organisations stated willingness in principle to collaborate. In prac-
tice, National Health Service (NHS), university and college participants have since proceeded to
model the economics of separate energy systems, including their own CHP and heat network
schemes, and have in some instances commenced investment; these activities undermined the pro-
jected carbon and energy saving logic of the collective actor solution. We examine below how this
came about.
The technical-economic model as market device: assembling narrative and numbers
about value
Each of the technical-economic business models narrated a future market among heat buyers and
sellers, structured by the physical artefacts of a new energy centre and heat network supplying clus-
ters of buildings. Value was framed in relation to long-term contracts for sale and purchase of heat:
buyers would secure a competitive price, while meeting carbon targets; an unspecified infrastructure
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investor/heat seller would correspondingly gain an ‘attractive’ financial return from secure revenues.
In the model, the opportunities were configured around the parties’ consent to act as the ‘right’ kinds
of long-term customers: their continuing need for large-scale heat supply would anchor the econ-
omics of the network. The hospitals would be the most significant customers, followed by the uni-
versities and council or government buildings; nearby multi-storey commercial and housing blocks
would provide secondary revenue streams for subsequent expansion.
The modelled viability of propositions hence centred on financialised measures of value, rather than
a multi-dimensional construct of use value of the asset as a long-term public good. The modelled trans-
lation of proposed heat networks into a profitable income stream for a financial investor was achieved
through a time discounted cash flow technique derived from finance theory (Chiapello 2015). In these
cases, the technique compresses complex and probabilistic models of future energy prices, infrastruc-
ture cost and performance, heat production and supply and carbon emissions into a single data-set.
This projects the financial value of investments in a single monetary indicator of net present value
of future cash flows. A discount rate, representing the cost of capital, is applied to this calculation,
and its level is critical to defining the relative profitability of different investments. Choice of discount
rate is shaped by economic definitions of the time value of money: a higher value is placed on the pre-
sent than on the future, and the greater the future uncertainty of cash flows the higher the discount rate,
making the project less viable for investment (Chiapello 2015). A lower, or ‘social’, discount rate places
greater value on long-term societal benefits. Cash flows for heat networks, which are unregulated assets
in a regulated energy market, are usually assessed as uncertain, increasing the discount rate and result-
ing cost of capital. Hence, heat network proposers need to enrol heat buyers in long-term contracts, in
order to secure future cash flows. East andWest City technical-economic models used discount rates of
6% and 7.5%, respectively. These rates are intermediate between the UK Treasury social discount rate
of 3.5% and commercial rates of 10% and above, and therefore positioned the public sector parties as
consenting to long-term purchase of heat, and implied that at least part of the capital investment would
also come from them, as a guarantee to private investors.
In the East City science park proposal, the financial returns and carbon savings in the first model
depended on the planned second hospital, which would comprise around half of heat demand. The esti-
mated reduction in greenhouse gas emissions was 30% per year relative to separate gas boilers, and
financial returns to an investor were projected at 12%. As we explain below, the NHS resisted enrolment
in such a heat market experiment, and a further iteration of the model, incorporating alternative
configurations of buildings, network scale and heat sources, was commissioned. Loss of the hospital
as a heat buyer meant that modelled carbon savings in this subsequent version were either negative
or considerably reduced, ranging from –4% to 12%, and the corresponding calculus of return on capital
investment varied from –0.7% to 12.3%. In West City, the consultants’ 2012 technical-economic model
had also revised an earlier version, and this second iteration estimated that, at 16,600 tonnes CO2 per
year, the network would achieve almost five times the carbon abatement shown in the initial model.
This would require twice the capital (£14 m), but the payback period was assessed as eight years,
rather than nine and a half, and the estimated 12.6% return on investment was double.
In both cities, the focus on financial value for an unspecified investor meant that the uncertainties
behind the numbers, and who would invest in what, under what identity, became critical in processes
of circulation and negotiation of the technical-economic models. The models’ projections of mutual
financial gain were contested and reinterpreted, as parties challenged the framing of relevant product
qualities, and the stability of facts about them, and questioned the allocations and valuations of costs
and benefits.
The encounter between heat market models and a public services market agencement
In one sense, the models were effective in assembling a calculus of financial value, but it was not the
one sought by government intermediaries and projected by the models. As discussions progressed, it
became evident that the technical-economic data was instead assimilated as component actor in an
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existing public services market agencement powerfully configured by competitive procurement and
private finance instruments and ‘best value’ rules in public spending; these economising techniques
framed the calculative capacities and characteristics of the parties.
At the East City site, for example, both existing and new hospitals were commissioned using UK
Private Finance Initiative (PFI)/Private Public Partnership (PPP) instruments: capital for construction
and servicing of the facilities comes from a private sector investment consortium; long-term debt is
repaid from public sector revenue budgets. The PPP framework is itself premised on normative theory
of market efficiency in construction and operation of public infrastructure, although this has become
increasingly contentious. A UK Parliament Treasury Committee (2011) report concluded for example
that, since the financial crisis, PPP projects have been significantly more expensive to fund than they
would be under direct public borrowing, and that evidence of benefits sufficient to offset the signifi-
cantly higher cost was lacking. The Treasury Committee (2011) report commented specifically on
the inflexibility of the private finance instrument for NHS facilities, due to the ‘financing structure
and its costly and complex procurement procedure’ (p. 5). Procurement of the new East City hospital
under PPP rules was nevertheless proceeding in 2013, imposing strict calculative and temporal
constraints on the assembly of a collective actor solution around a heat market. A particular area of
contention in East City discussions between NHS team and government intermediary was the
envisaged intractable legal problems in a relationship between a hospital private sector consortium,
who would face financial penalties for failure of heating and hot water supply, and a separate heat sup-
plier. The cognitive and affective pressures on managers responsible for procurement of the hospital,
under the politicised PPPmodel, contributed to contentious negotiations. Ultimately, the procurement
documents specified a requirement for a CHP system serving only the hospital estate, undermining the
collaborative heat market proposal brokered by the government agency:
It was very, very disappointing for us. (Margaret, Enterprise Officer)
The agency sought to salvage potential for future collaboration through NHS agreement to insert a
requirement for future connection to a heat network in revised procurement documents. Ironically
this weaker bid to enrol the NHS was undermined by a second government body, responsible for
infrastructure commissioning, which argued that any variation in procurement terms risked ﬁnan-
cial penalties, and set undesirable future precedents: unsuccessful bidders could seek compensation
for the work of amending their original bid.
The heat market model had also incorporated financial benefits for both the NHS and a heat net-
work investor from sale of surplus heat from the existing hospital’s CHP system to a shared network.
This was in turn undermined by the existing 30-year PFI framework contract, which had com-
menced in 1998 and constituted any variation in contract terms as a cost-bearing risk:
It just seems to be an absolute nightmare … it’s twelve banks that are financing it, and for any decision to be
taken, all 12 banks need to agree … So [investment consortium] have told us before, and told the NHS, that
they do not wish to see any change in their risk profile and any change in their profit, because that will cause the
banks major headaches, because … they’re buying into an income stream… (Margaret, Enterprise Officer)
The PFI/PPP conﬁguration of a public hospital as an ‘income stream’ again prioritised ﬁnancial value
for private investors over the public value of energy and carbon saving. The calculations of value by
NHS participants interacting with the heat market model were powerfully conﬁgured by this public
services market agencement of commercial contracting and private ﬁnance. This assemblage worked
against more open-ended evaluation of innovation for an area-wide, collaborative solution to low
carbon heating and hot water supplies at the greenﬁeld site.
Heat market models and ‘best value’ rules in public finance: intersections of price, fairness
and reputation
West City negotiations also assimilated the technical-economic model into the public services mar-
ket agencement, illustrated here in relation to market framing of Best Value in public spending5 and
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associated ‘competitive advantage’ discourse. The modelled allocations of costs and benefits in a heat
market were a focus for struggles over fairness of the propositions, and hence over their viability.
This was not about fairness in a simple sense of price comparison, but about fair price as configured
by alternative formulae. In this case, an existing public sector energy procurement ‘club’ established
the standard for best value price comparison and definition of relative fairness. In the procurement
club, higher gas users received a cheaper tariff, giving the NHS the lowest unit cost for gas heating.
The heat market model projected a standard tariff for all customers, and sought to demonstrate some
additional value for each party, but allocated zero savings on supply price to the NHS. Furthermore,
the modelled location for a shared energy centre was on the hospital site; the narrative noted that this
implied demolition of a building and use of land with potentially high value to the NHS, but the
associated costs were excluded from the calculus. Nevertheless, the highest financial gains in the
model were allocated to the hospital, but these came from a discounted price for electricity (supplied
from the new on site CHP engine) and the avoided carbon taxes from the then UK tax on large
energy users.6 The second highest financial gains, which were only 10% below those allocated to
the hospital, accrued to one of the universities, which was expected to buy only one-third the amount
of heat bought by the hospital. NHS officials assessed the modelled costs and benefits allocated to the
hospital as unfair, arguing that their share of costs could be interpreted as subsidising benefits accru-
ing to others.
For all of the parties, definitions of fair or best value were also framed by a media discourse about
‘wasteful’ public spending and the non-monetary value of a public reputation for thrift:
[A freedom of information request could reveal] you were paying x before, now you’re paying x+10; who
thought that was a good idea? Then your name’s all over the papers about squandering… (Robert, West
City estates manager, university B)
If the press gets hold of it, the press just tears these things to shreds and blows them out of proportion. (Graham,
West City NHS estates manager)
The reverse counterfactual, that procurement club prices would exceed those of the shared heat net-
work, was not a cause for concern. Within the club, although the tariffs paid by each organisation
varied, responsibility for achieving best value passed to the club formula, where a narrative grounded
in dominant theories about price competition guaranteed its attainment. Whether it actually
achieved a better price than alternatives was not the core concern:
Neither you nor anybody else … would be able to demonstrate that’s produced better prices. However, there
are plenty of diagrams and calculations to show how much money’s been saved. But, let’s say we save forty
million, where’s the forty million? Is that going back into the economy? It’s all notional savings … So we’re
paying less now than we did last year … so why is that? Is that because it’s a procurement exercise, or the mar-
ket going down? And you’re paying more, so is that because of procurement, or because the market’s gone up?
(Robert, estates manager, West City university B)
The value of the club formula was less a matter of price, or unequivocal ﬁnancial savings, than of the
protection this conferred on managers from exposure to media and public criticism. The practical
inscrutability of the price formula meant that, rather than being adopted on the basis of an economic
hypothesis (which human cognitive limitations would preclude testing), its efﬁciencies were treated
as axiomatic. In contrast, collaborating in long-term contracts for heating and hot water supply from
a local energy services company would expose the organisation, and its ofﬁcials, to reputational risks;
any perceived increase in energy spending could be blamed on the organisations, or even the man-
agers personally.
The only heat market assemblage regarded as fair by all parties was an independent energy ser-
vices company investing in a heat network, and taking responsibility for constructing a separate price
offer to each party, which would then be judged on its merits. The West City parties however
regarded the prospect of, as one put it, ‘Joe Bloggs energy company’ saying ‘we’ll invest in the
whole scheme and supply whoever puts their hand up’ as unlikely. Responding to the modelled
8 J. WEBB AND D. HAWKEY
cash flow and its embedded discount rate, they considered it more likely that each heat ‘customer’
would have to provide at least a proportion of the infrastructure finance in order to demonstrate the
commitment necessary to attract external investors. This raised the prospect of protracted nego-
tiations over shares of costs, benefits and responsibilities.
The ‘right’ heat users in the ‘wrong’ roles?
Securing the integrated energy, cost and carbon economies imagined by the heat market experiments
relied on assembling long-term interdependencies between prospective buyers and supplier(s). Pub-
lic procurement, budgeting and finance instruments however framed such interdependence as hav-
ing diseconomies, and constituted instead a motive for competition between public sector bodies.
This did not eliminate reflexivity about the failure to address the collective actor problem of climate
change, which was recognised as undermining a stated willingness to collaborate, and as likely to
have some political consequences in the informal moral economy of public services. The resulting
unease contributed to parties assessing other ways in which carbon saving objectives could be accom-
modated to the public services market actor network, and work to their advantage. Organisations
proceeded to commission independent technical-economic models of CHP investment, with self
supply of electricity as well as heat. The West City NHS team, for example, perceiving the modelled
heat market to have limited benefits and disproportionate costs to them, commissioned a separate
model which projected capital costs of one-third of the multi-party network, considerably higher
financial return to the NHS, because of savings on electricity bills, and carbon savings of around
40%. These were however lower carbon savings than those allocated to the hospital in the multi-
party model. In East City, procurement of the second hospital also proceeded with an NHS-only
CHP system. One of the West City universities secured grant funding for a campus CHP system
through a higher education sector initiative; the other West City university, building on understand-
ing developed through engagement with heat market proposals, made a bid to the same funder. The
East City university has also proceeded independently, and the enterprise agency had already built
business facilities with stand alone gas boilers at the site.
These initiatives were not pursued deliberately to undermine the multi-party network, but as a
means to increase the financial value captured by their organisation. The bounded, time-constrained
and segmented rules of public sector finance also however conditioned an aversion to
interdependence:
Because [the grant funder] is giving the cash to ourselves it needs to be ring fenced around, [the funder] can’t be
giving us money to enable somebody else. … [In addition] Clock is ticking, usual government criteria is ‘here’s
a lot of money and the key criteria is you need to spend it by a deadline’. (Michael, carbon and energy manager,
West City university B)
The focus on ﬁnancial advantage for each individual organisation creates an additional perverse
incentive to run CHP engines even when heat production exceeds what can be used, hence under-
mining the logic of carbon saving:
The bigger the CHP unit you put in, the more electricity you generate, which is where all of your financial sav-
ings come from, but then you have a hell of a lot of heat you need to get shot of … It’s worthwhile for us to
over-aim the size of the CHP slightly. There’s a financial benefit to us, even if we just dumped all of the heat into
the atmosphere. (Michael, carbon and energy manager, West City university B)
Although in some respects single user CHP provides a platform for subsequent area networks, the
collective actor problem is more intractable, and the loss of any ﬁnancial logic to support intercon-
nection is stark:
If the NHS have their system, [… ] and we have our system here, and there’s four million pounds worth of
interconnection work that needs to happen in between them, who is going to pay for that? (Michael, carbon
and energy manager, West City university B)
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Even if interconnection of the small networks could be ﬁnanced, this would create a very different
conﬁguration from the modelled multi-party system, with reduced climate protection and welfare
beneﬁts. Large heat users represent signiﬁcant long-term revenues for an energy services company,
enabling repayment of capital. In both cities, however, the NHS hospitals and universities translated
the modelled heat market into an opportunity to sell rather than buy heat, while gaining ﬁnancially
from self supply of electricity. A notional investor in an area heat network would be left dependent
on a large number of smaller customers forming a market for surplus heat supplied by the large
organisations. The heat network business investor would then have a large debt, low revenues, pro-
blems caused by concentration of demand in the coldest months of the year, and insecure returns.
Ironically the technical-economic models set in train developments which undermined the collective
actor solution of shared heat network infrastructure, making the envisaged carbon savings and
societal beneﬁts harder to achieve.
On not assembling a heat market
I think there’s a feeling that all the ducks are in the duck pond, but nothing’s quite lined up. (Karen, East City
council officer)
Neither heat market experiment, whether greenﬁeld or retroﬁt site, nor any variant of original
models, has thus far proved viable. The technical-economic model, relied on by government inter-
mediaries as a market device to assemble a new actor, found no material purchase with either com-
mercial investors, who were invisible in negotiations, or public sector parties. The latter contested the
value to their organisation of such a venture, and resisted its interdependencies, making voluntaristic
enrolment elusive:
Even down at [science park site], you know, you just despair. If anything is set up to benefit from things like
district heating in a properly coordinated support structure, your major new hospital sites with all this expan-
sion for the next 20, 40, 50 years; you can’t even have a sensible discussion about integration because it is all
your different stakeholders, different contracts. Unless you’re legislated it ain’t going anywhere. (Andrew, East
City university director of estates)
These public sector ‘market players’ were responsive to the modelled ﬁnancial calculations, but
assimilated them into far more potent public services market agencements constituted by the cen-
trally governed rigours and material force of private ﬁnance and competitive procurement instru-
ments, ‘best value’ public spending frameworks and segmented budget accounting rules. The
resulting organisation economicus dis-embedded the public bodies and their ofﬁcials from social
ties of locality, mutual accountability and coordinated action, and legitimated competition between
them. Those construed in the model as locally autonomous decision-makers emerge as only partially
local. Although the ofﬁcials representing each organisation continued to articulate a sense of moral
responsibility to respond to climate change, this did not provide a foundation for common cause.
Their discretion was constrained by the ﬁnancial and contractual instruments conﬁguring such mar-
ket assemblages. The disciplining power of the instruments interacted with affective and cognitive
dynamics, contributing to a conservative force towards continuation of current energy market trans-
actions. Signiﬁcant professional and personal hazards were implicated in the demands of commis-
sioning and managing long term, complex private ﬁnance contracts. Heat network commissioning
would be one more accretion in the web of contracting and outsourcing. Familiar cultural scripts,
constituted around formal metrics, legitimated existing practices, sheltering ofﬁcials and organis-
ations from anticipated reputational damage. Since there was no necessity for them to value the com-
mon good, each party pursued the selﬁsh rational actor solution, leaving the collective actor problem
unresolved:
The reality is we’ve no real need to operate at this level together… there’s no need for us really to interact with
the hospital. There’s no real need for us to interact with the city council. There’s no need for us to really interact
with [university A] and even less with [West City Housing Association]… So somebody has to bind all those
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people together… First of all you have to force them to work together, and once you give them a common
purpose, I think it will work, but it won’t work naturally. (Robert, estates manager, west city university B)
Discussion and conclusion
Political-economic commitments to markets as means to solve societal problems pose important
questions about the scope for their re-design to coordinate the urgent mitigation of climate change
(Blunden & Arndt 2016). We have examined the ‘careers’ of two experiments to assemble markets
for heat network infrastructure. These were led by government intermediaries as a means to solve the
collective actor problem of building low carbon heat infrastructure as part of climate policy. Tech-
nical-economic models were intended to construct the market value to investors and heat buyers of a
joint venture. The models however reduced the appraisal of value to a primarily financial measure.
Public service professionals in universities, NHS and city councils understood the need for collabor-
ation in principle, but in practice the primacy of finance metrics and cost competitiveness meant that
they focused on contesting the calculations, and shares, of monetary costs and benefits. In this way,
the model calculations were subsumed into the material market agencements of public services, con-
stituting the interdependencies of a heat market as a cost to be avoided. The common purpose of
climate protection was marginalised, and carbon saving reduced to what one party characterised
as no more than a ‘helpful bonus’. Government agencies themselves appeared to lack insight into
the limits and contradictions of such market devices, suggesting the tensions and divergences of pol-
itical purpose within governments over public services and private finance, energy markets and cli-
mate change.
The research findings also point to the need for further conceptual development of a material
sociology of markets, notably in relation to the workings of power in such hybrid, and intersecting,
market agencements, and the differential embedding of interests and values. Returning to a key con-
jecture of actor network theory, that forms of agency are defined by the particular socio-technical
constituents of the network, it is evident that some network actors have little capacity for collabor-
ation over public goods. More research is needed to understand the erosion of such capacities, evi-
dent here even in public services, and the societal consequences. In the UK, for example, it is
primarily central governments, with control over statutory powers and budgets available to regional
and city governments, which sets the frameworks of public accounting formulae, private finance and
regulatory institutions. Sociology could contribute more to systematic analysis of such instruments,
their formations of value, and their material effects in extending markets in public services.
The stalled assembly of low carbon heat markets in these cases, and unresolved controversies over
the calculus of value, highlight the limits to plasticity in energy market experiments, and the need for
constructive political and social challenge to such limits. Using markets to protect public goods of a
stable climate is particularly difficult, given the highly established, powerful fossil fuel industry, and
sunk investments in generation and supply technologies, on which we all rely. The industry is
entangled in the political and economic process, and in the associated networks of regulatory incen-
tives, taxes and business rates. Market experiments seem most feasible currently when little or no
investment in new infrastructure networks is required. Improvised trading relationships are for
example emerging around existing electricity grids, where decentralised and small scale electricity
technologies and battery storage can be used to coordinate a virtual power plant, and hence contrib-
ute to balancing electricity supply and demand. Such experiments are unlikely when new capital-
intensive network infrastructure is needed, and there are incumbent, affordable alternatives, as in
the example of heat vs. gas grids. The idea of the heat grid in clean energy policy is premised on
its future adaptability for experiments in heat recovery from sources currently wasted, but current
markets lack any actor willing to take responsibility for investing in such long-term public goods.
Making such an actor requires re-engagement across business, state and civil society in delibera-
tive governance processes of the kind envisaged by Callon (2009) in his account of civilising markets.
If policy aspirations for low carbon heat from new network infrastructure are to be realised,
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governments and publics need to address the disabling effects of segmented public sector cost
metrics, and the economic and human costs of long term, inflexible concession contracts with private
investment consortia. The risks of economic short-termism, the reliance on price as a proxy for
value, and failure to encompass the societal value of innovation for clean energy need to be at the
core, not the margins, of negotiations about the substance and structuring of markets. This means
enquiring into the configuration of economic agencies with capacities beyond those of maximising
financial return. A starting point for assembling local heat markets for example is likely to be political
and senior management sponsorship of long-term investment in decentralised energy infrastructure
at social discount rates. The first steps of this kind are being taken by the UK government through a
£320 million capital fund for heat network investment, and open consultation about fund manage-
ment principles (UK Government DECC 2016). Greater devolution of financial and budgetary
powers to city and regional governments would also lay groundwork for cooperation in identifying
common purpose at locality scale. Conditions under which at least some parties find collaboration
for a low carbon energy system to be crucial to their objectives may then be assembled. Such govern-
ance issues are more than academic: there is pervasive concern, manifest in our research, about who
will take responsibility for what actions to develop a clean, affordable and secure energy system,
accountable to the public.
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Notes
1. ‘By 2050, all buildings will need to have an emissions footprint close to zero’ (UK Carbon Plan 2011, p. 5).
Forty-five per cent of current emissions from buildings are associated with use of fossil fuels for heating.
2. Gas CHP remains a common platform for establishing heat networks in the UK, and provides higher technical
efficiencies in fuel conversion, by using the waste heat from generation of electricity. The potential for sub-
sequent connection of locally available heat sources, such as biomass, biogas or energy from waste facilities,
is treated as a means to secure further carbon savings.
3. The researchers co-organised five workshops (web site reference to be inserted).
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